During the Camp David talks in September 1978, in which President Carter mediated between Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, eventually achieving a peace treaty between the two sides, the only other news coming across the news wires was about “riots’ in Iran in several cities against the Shah’s regime. Although we were aware of anti-Shah sentiment in Iran, I don’t think we in the press corps took it too seriously. But Vance, in his memoirs, says that “on September 8, the Shah dec;ared martial law in a number of cities that had been centers of unrest. In clashes between the military and the demonstrators, a large number of demonstrators were killed, presaging a new spate of demonstrations and strikes.” Vance said that the Shah was depressed by his inability to restores oder and uncertain what he should do next. Vance said he urged Carter to call the Shah to reaffirm support, which he did. Also Sadat dud the same. But the crisis continued.
I had made two trips to Iran, both on Kissinger jaunts. On the first one, in November 1973, during Kissinger’s round-the-world trip which included his first public visit to China, we reporters did not see the Shah. On the second one, in August 1976 as part of what was in effect Kissinger’s farewell tour, we did meet the Shah at his summer home at Nowshahz on the Caspian Sea. We had a brief press conference with him, in which he rebutted a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report that said Iran was having trouble handling the vast amount of arms it was purchasing. He asserted to us that a strong, well-armed Iran was in the interest of the West and he was not in the mood to accept criticism. The next day, in fact, in Teheran, Kissinger signed a $10 billion arms deal over the next decade. And Kissinger went out of his way to praise Iran’s cooperation with the United States.
“If one looks at the threats, the potential threats Iran faces and the armaments of its neighbors and the role Iran has played in international affairs, its effort at self-defense is strongly in the American interest and is not a favor we do for Iran,” Kissinger said, and I duly reported.
That was, of course, all background for the elections in 1976 in which Jimmy Carter, espousing the importance of human rights in foreign affairs, won the election and caused concern in the mind of the Shah, who was well aware of the growing sentiment in Congress against selling arms to his country because of its alleged human rights abuses.
Vance went to Teheran in early May 1977 to attend a meeting of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). a dying group set up by the Eisenhower administration. But Vance wanted to reassure the Shah of American support. In his meeting with the Shah on May 13, 1977, Vance wrote in his memoirs that the Shah “was an intelligent, quiet, yet imperious man,” Vance also said that the Shah, although apparently decisive,” left him with the impression “that he was insecure.” Vance says that he delivered an invitation from Carter to visit the White House that November, and that the Shah “was delighted,”
I was focused in 1977 primarily on Soviet-American relations and had gone to Geneva to cover the follow-up to Vance’s seemingly disastrous trip to Moscow in March 1977. The negotiations for a treaty limiting long-range offensive nuclear weapons continued apace, and Carter actually signed a treaty with Brezhnev in Vienna in the spring of 1979.
Meanwhile, the Shah’s visit to Washington was on schedule for November 1977 and in advance of his visit, I reported that the Shah had informed the United States that Iran in contrast to past practice, would not take the lead in seeking an increase in oil prices at the year’s end OPEC meeting in Caracas. But the front page significance of the trip was that his visit to the White House was marred by tear gas that had wafted in from the use by Park Police to break up fights between pro and anti-Shah demonstrators near the White House. According to William Sullivan, the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, the Shah returned home in good spirits from his talks with Carter and other officials. And much to the Shah’s surprise Carter added Teheran to his end of the year world tour for a stop-over on New Year’s Eve, 1977-78. Carter wanted just an informal evening, but the Shah insisted on a white-tie affair with speeches and dancing. And in a way, that became the high point of relations. In an ad-lib toast to the Shah, Carter said the Shah was “dearly beloved by his people and sustaining an an island of stability in his part of the world.” Ambassador Sullivan said that the toast “would later come back to haunt the the record of the Carter administration in subsequent days.” Vance said in his memoirs that Carter’s words “would come back to haunt us.”
Throughout 1978, there were violent protests around Iran against the Shah, fanned in part by sermons made in Paris by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei that were recorded and played back in Iran. Sullivan had recommended negotiating with Khomenei but nothing came of his suggestion. The Shah’s situation worsened just as the Camp David talks began in September 1978. Eventually the Shah departed Iran on January 19, 1979, not to the United States where he had originally planned to go, but to Egypt to be close in case the military was able to restore order quickly. The Shah was never to return to Iran. But the sentiment in Iran was clearly no longer favorable to the Shah. Khomenei returned to Iran in triumph on February 1, and that was followed by the collapse of the government appointed by the Shah. Vance, in his memoirs, notes that in this period, Brzezinski, without telling him, told the undersecretary of state, David Newsom, to ask Sullivan for an assessment of the chances for a military coup. Sullivan reportedly gave an unprintable reply.
On Valentine’s Day, February 14, 1979, everything came to a head both in Afghanistan and Iran. In Kabul, the U.S. Ambassador, Adolph Dubs had been kidnapped and held for the release of Afghan prisoners. But when Afghan police tried to rescue him, he died in the ensuring gun fight. And in Teheran, the U.S. Embassy found itself under siege for two hours but Iranian authorities moved to end the siege. But instead of seeing the siege as a warning, Washington believed the worst had passed. Sullivan retired from the foreign service that summer, as did his deputy. Bruce Laingen was sent out to replace him, but the Iranians would not accept him as an ambassador, making him remain as a charge d’affaires. Meanwhile, a controversy arose over the Shah’s desire to enter the United States for medical treatment. The Carter administration was reluctant to let him into the country for fear of repercussions in Teheran. But under heavy pressure from people like David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger, the Shah was admitted for treatment at the end of October and Iran was duly notified. But on November 4, 1979, some 300 Iranian students were able to break through the fortified American embassy and take all those inside prisoners. They said they would hold on to the embassy until the Shah was returned to Iran.
The Times ran a single column Reuters story about the embassy seizure and I wrote an accompanying story saying Iranian officials had promised to do what they could to free the hostages. My story suggested that officials in Washington were not putting much faith in those promises. The next day the Iranian government collapsed and Khomenei took charge of the situation. I had no idea then that I would be writing almost a story a day for more than a year about the hostage crisis. The hostage crisis caused a national furor. It dominated the TV and radio waves.On Novemebr 9, there were large-scale parades in Washington against the hostage takers, but there were also some pro-Iranian marchers. I was asked to write the lead story for the Sunday Week in Review section. I wrote: “The past week was, in President Carter’s own words, ‘the worst I’ve had in office.’ ‘It’s tough going,’ said Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, his face showing strain and fatigue after long, fruitless hours in search of a solution.’ Of course, when those words were written no one thought the crisis would last some 444 days, that it would see a failed a U.S> rescue operation, the resignation of Vance and Carter’s failed re-election campaign.
Adding to Carter’s shock was the Soviet Union’s decision on December 27, 1979 to take over Afghanistan. At a year-end briefing for White House correspondents, Carter warned the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan or face “serious consequences” in its relations with the United States. When I interviewed Vance in his office on January 14, 1980, he said that Carter had given the Russians until mid-February to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan or face the likelihood of an American boycott of the summer Olympics scheduled for Moscow that year. Various diplomatic approaches were tried on Iran and all failed. I had been pretty sure that a military solution was not in the cards so I was as surprised as ayone when Carter said at a televised news conference on April 17. 1980 that “some sort of military action” against Iran would seem to be the only alternative if sanctions did not produce the early release of the hostages..
I was sound asleep at home in Washington on the night of April 24-25 when I was awakened by a call from the foreign desk alerting me to a story moving on the wires saying there had been an abortive attempt to free the hostages by force. When I telephoned the press office of the White House at 1 am I was happily surprised to find a spokesman ready to read me a statement confirming the failed attempt. Later that week, we learned that Vance had resigned in protest over the military move which occurred while he was on vacation
Eventually, negotiations began later in the year to in effect ransom the hostages through the use of Iranian funds which had been seized by the United States. They were all freed on Ronald Reagan’s Inauguration Day.
